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12 The ethics of transactions in
an unjust world
Joseph Millum
Introduction
The world is indisputably unjust and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
No individual has the power to correct this injustice. For the vast majority of
people, even if they do everything they can, the corrective change they will
produce will be small. Individual agents must therefore interact with one
another against a backdrop of injustice.
Individual transactions across national borders or between citizens of diﬀerent
states are increasingly common. These include straightforward trade in goods,
but also trans-national hiring, medical tourism, international collaborative
medical research, the sharing of biological samples and other uses of people’s
bodies. With these transactions, even in cases where all parties agree to
arrangements that are expected to beneﬁt all, there may be concerns about
ethical violations. For example, in 2007, Indonesia stopped sharing H5N1
(avian ﬂu) samples with the World Health Organization’s Global Inﬂuenza
Surveillance Network because it judged that its population was highly unlikely
to get access to a vaccine in the event of a ﬂu pandemic (Sedyaningsih et al.
2008). There have been multiple cases in which complaints have been raised
about the uncompensated or under-compensated use of indigenous people’s
knowledge about their environment (Millum 2010). One of the central debates in
international research ethics concerns the distribution of beneﬁts and burdens
when research is conducted in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). It
is widely believed that in order for such research to be ethical, beneﬁts must
accrue not just to research participants, but to the populations from which
those participants are drawn (Emanuel 2008).
In this chapter I examine the ethics of beneﬁt-sharing agreements between
victims and beneﬁciaries of injustice in the context of trans-national bodily
giving, selling and sharing.1 Some obligations are the same no matter who the
parties to a transaction are. Prohibitions on threats, fraud and harm apply
universally and their application to transactions in unjust contexts is not dis-
puted. I identify three sources of obligations that are aﬀected by unjust
background conditions. First, power disparities may illegitimately inﬂuence
transactions in unintentional ways. Second, better-oﬀ individuals have duties
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to ameliorate injustices. These are not speciﬁcally duties to those with whom
they interact, though often it is easier and more eﬀective to help those with
whom one already interacts. Third, the power diﬀerentials created by injustice
make exploitative transactions more likely. I summarize a transactional
account of exploitation and argue that avoiding exploitation is usually easiest
to achieve by ensuring that the more powerful party does not obtain an unfair
share of the beneﬁts from the transaction. The beneﬁciaries of a transaction
do not have to be only those individuals directly involved in it. Indeed, in
many cases it is thought that exploitation may be avoided by providing beneﬁts
to third parties. Working out when this is the case requires working out when
a contribution or burden on another’s behalf can count towards the avoidance
of exploitation. I argue that it counts as such in two main cases: when the
people in question are already involved in relationships of reciprocation, and
when the individual making the contribution identiﬁes with the interests of
the other people.
The central examples I draw on in this chapter concern trans-national
forms of exchange involving people’s bodies. However, my conclusions apply
equally to individuals transacting in any unjust institutional context, including
within a single nation-state. I also mostly discuss the responsibilities of indivi-
dual actors. However, this should not be taken to refer to just single, isolated
people. Any entity that acts as one may count here, including corporations,
ministries of health, families and so on.
Background injustice
In claiming that the world is unjust I am making a claim about distributive
justice. That is, I am making a claim about the way that institutions, broadly
construed, distribute rights, duties and – most importantly for the cases I am
interested in – resources.2 These institutions include national governments,
but also trans-national institutions, such as the United Nations and the World
Trade Organization. The fact that there are institutions that greatly aﬀect the
distribution of resources internationally implies that the international order
can be appraised to see if it is just. More or less all political philosophers –
from cosmopolitans to statists – agree that there are principles of justice that
apply globally.3 The fact that more than three billion people live on less than
US$2.50 a day, while the 500 richest people are worth approximately
US$3.5 trillion is powerful evidence that the global order is in fact unjust
(Shah 2013). I do not argue further for this claim here.
The transactions that generate particular ethical concern as a result of this
injustice are those that take place between parties who are in diﬀerent positions
in the global order. We may be concerned, for example, when pharmaceutical
companies transact with marginalized indigenous communities, or when rich
high-income-country patients with kidney failure transact with very poor
potential organ donors. Paradigmatically, then, we are concerned about
interactions between two parties, in which some sort of exchange is proposed,
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from which one or both parties stand to beneﬁt, and in which the parties start
from very unequal positions.4 In general, we are also naturally more con-
cerned with the wrongs that may be committed by the more powerful party,
though, of course, all parties will have obligations.5
Wrongs can be committed within such transactions as a result of how the
terms of the transaction – what is to be done and how the costs and beneﬁts
of doing so are to be distributed – are reached. For example, one person
might get her way by presenting a credible threat to the other party and
thereby coercing him. She might engage in deception about what beneﬁts will
accrue to him and thereby fraudulently set the terms. Or she might act negligently
while doing what they agreed to and unjustiﬁably harm him. Both parties
may have diﬃculty communicating and agreeing on mutually acceptable
terms simply because of cultural, linguistic, or other impediments to a
straightforward interaction. But all of these are problems that frequently arise
independent of whether the actors involved are beneﬁciaries or victims of
injustice. Although they require careful ethical analysis, they do not require it
because of injustice.
Three ethical concerns may arise as a result of background injustice. First,
when powerful actors interact with those who have little power, even if they
do not use unethical means to inﬂuence the terms of a transaction, they may
be perceived as doing so. For example, a doctor may not be threatening her
patients when she asks them to participate in a clinical trial in which she is
involved. However, a patient may have no other access to care, and may not
feel empowered to insist on his rights; he may perceive a threat of abandonment,
even if one does not exist. Such possibilities entail pro tanto duties on the
parties to a transaction to make reasonable eﬀorts to ensure that the trans-
action not only does not wrong people, but is not perceived as doing so. I do
not think this is controversial. The real challenges in this regard do not
require ethical analysis but are practical problems concerning how to fulﬁl this
obligation in diﬀerent cultural and socio-economic contexts. Second, those who
are the beneﬁciaries of injustice, those who are more powerful and those who
have more resources, may have greater duties to ameliorate injustice. It might
be thought that these duties are owed to those with whom they transact.
I consider this possibility in the next section. Finally, transactions can be fully
consensual and mutually beneﬁcial, and yet be exploitative. The power
diﬀerentials created by injustice make exploitative transactions more likely.
I examine at length how exploitation can be avoided in the latter part of the
chapter.
The obligation to redress injustice
The area of transitional theory that addresses the obligations of individuals to
work towards justice is underdeveloped. However, it is plausible that moral
agents who live under unjust social institutions have some obligations to make
those institutions more just, especially if they are the beneﬁciaries of injustice.
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It is also possible that outsiders to unjust social institutions have some, per-
haps weaker, obligations to improve them. These obligations may be both
negative – requiring non-interference with others who are working towards
justice – and positive – requiring that the agent perform actions in order to
improve her social institutions. They are likely to be pro tanto obligations,
that is, obligations that can be outweighed by countervailing obligations and
limited in how much they can demand of individual agents.
In order to work out whether such obligations aﬀect the ethics of transac-
tions, it is necessary to consider what grounds them. There are two plausible
candidates. First, they might be grounded in a general duty of beneﬁcence,
such as the duty of rescue.6 If this is correct, then there will be no additional
duties that arise in virtue of interacting with the victims of injustice: duties of
beneﬁcence arise because of the extent of the needs of the beneﬁciary and the
ability of the benefactor to provide a beneﬁt, not because of any interaction
between them. However, it may be that it is easier to provide beneﬁts to
people with whom one interacts. For example, a duty like the duty to rescue is
more likely to be triggered when interacting with people who are likely to
need rescuing. The fact that benefactor and (potential) victim are already
interacting can dramatically lower the cost to the benefactor of providing the
rescue. If a researcher collecting blood samples from a population is already
screening them for HIV, the cost of contacting HIV-positive donors and
referring them to a clinic is likely to be low. Such referral could therefore be
an ethically required rescue. By contrast, there is not a rescue-based obliga-
tion to engage with such a population in the ﬁrst place, just to ensure that
those who are HIV-positive are identiﬁed and referred.7
Second, one may acquire duties in virtue of being part of an unjust system.
In order to avoid complicity with injustice it might be necessary to do some-
thing to repair the injustice, even if you did not create it yourself (Malmqvist
2013). Someone who is the beneﬁciary of injustice, such as someone who
receives more than her fair share of the gains of social cooperation, might
have an obligation on the basis of restitution to help repair the system. Again, a
prior interaction might make such repair or restitution easier. For example, a
high-income-country scientist is better placed to upgrade the infrastructure
and train technicians at a research site in a low-income country when she is
actually collaborating with that site. Again, however, the duty would not be
related to any interactions between the beneﬁciaries and victims of injustice.
Such duties would stand even if they were otherwise isolated from one
another.
It might be that it is possible to discharge one’s duties to make the global
order more just through beneﬁting those with whom one transacts. It might
also be easier to beneﬁt those with whom one transacts, which could trigger
a duty to do so. However, the transaction is unconnected to the grounds
for the obligation to repair injustice. Such obligations do not, therefore,
seem likely to aﬀect the ethics of transactions against a background of
injustice.8
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Exploitation and how to avoid it
While our duties to repair injustice, arguably, do not depend on the individual
transactions in which we are engaged, our duties to avoid exploitation do.
According to Alan Wertheimer, one party to a transaction exploits another
when she takes unfair advantage of him (Wertheimer 1996, 207). Suppose the
local water supply is temporarily contaminated and only one, privately
owned, well remains. Provided that there are no other sources of clean water,
people will pay as much as they can aﬀord for the water, since they need it to
survive. If the owner of the well massively increases the price of water, then
she will be taking advantage of the local population’s need for her water. If
we think that it is unfair to charge more for water just because the other
supplies are contaminated then she will be taking unfair advantage of the
local population, that is, she will be exploiting them.
Charges of exploitation are often raised against trans-national transactions.
This was the complaint that Indonesia made to justify stopping sharing
H5N1 samples – the government thought that they were contributing to a
resource whose beneﬁts were going to go to rich countries’ citizens, but not to
poor Indonesians. When the knowledge of the San people of southern Africa
about the appetite-suppressing qualities of hoodia was used to develop products
for the Western weight loss industry, one of the complaints of the San was that
they should have the opportunity to beneﬁt from the commercialization
(Wynberg 2004). Their lack of access to the technology needed to commer-
cialize hoodia and their open communication about its properties made them
vulnerable to exploitation by better resourced and connected outsiders. When
it is argued that clinical research in low- and middle-income countries ought
to be “responsive” to the health needs of the local populations, the most
plausible explanation of why people think this is that they think responsiveness
can prevent research from being exploitative (CIOMS 2002, Guideline 10;
Millum 2012b).
Social injustice frequently makes exploitation easier. Much of the time, the
beneﬁciaries of injustice have greater bargaining power than the victims of
injustice, as a consequence of the resulting disparities between them. Consider,
for example, how economic disparities make exploitation more likely. Some-
one poor is likely to need a given amount of money much more than someone
wealthy. She is therefore more likely to agree to terms that are unfair than he is.
The wages and working conditions of sweatshops can result from these sorts
of disparities. Given suﬃcient poverty in a population and surplus labour
supply, people will agree to work in conditions that are clearly unfair, so long
as they are still better oﬀ than they would be without the work.9
If exploitation occurs when one party takes unfair advantage of another,
this suggests two ways in which exploitation can be prevented. The ﬁrst is to
equalize the power disparities between the parties that make it possible for
one to take advantage of the other. If two people are roughly economically
equal, have access to the same information and so on, then neither will be
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able to make the other agree to an unfair distribution of beneﬁts. This is one
justiﬁcation, for example, for allowing workers to form unions. The union has
greater bargaining power than do individual workers and, normally, in heavily
unionized industries it is not easy for an employer to take advantage of a
surplus of workers to drive down the wages paid to each.
The other way to prevent exploitation is to ensure that the distribution of
the beneﬁts and burdens of the transaction is fair. If the beneﬁts and burdens
are distributed fairly, then it is not possible for the more powerful party to
take unfair advantage of the vulnerable situation of the other.10 Laws that set
minimum wages or that make stipulations about the quality of working con-
ditions can be understood as attempts to prevent unfair agreements about
how the beneﬁts and burdens of work should be distributed.11 They therefore
use this strategy to prevent the exploitation of workers.
Both ways to prevent exploitation face challenges in specifying what is
meant by their normative terms. What does it mean for a distribution of
beneﬁts and burdens to be fair? There is no agreement on principles of fairness
for transactions; rather, much of the time people rely on intuitive judgments
(Wertheimer 1996, 207–246). What does it mean for two individuals to have
equal power? Neither analytic philosophy nor the bioethics literature provide
analyses of power that are easy to apply to the sorts of transactions with
which this chapter is concerned.
However, the strategy of preventing exploitation by ensuring that the beneﬁts
and burdens of a transaction are fairly distributed has one clear advantage.
When there is a diﬀerence in power between two parties, trying to equalize
their power may be highly problematic. First, it may be very hard to achieve.
For example, the privileges of being a Western scientist are not easily given
up. Second, quite prudently given the unjust state of the world, people may
not want to unilaterally relinquish their power. Third, the mutually beneﬁcial
transaction may rely on the advantages of the more powerful party. The
Western scientist who renounces her position, ignores funding opportunities
and refuses to use her contacts is likely to be of little use to a fellow scientist
in an under-resourced institution in sub-Saharan Africa.
By contrast, it is often possible to make the terms of one’s transactions fair
without running into these problems. The Western scientist can keep her privi-
leges, retain her connections and funding, and yet still work out a memorandum
of understanding that ensures that her collaborators are fairly rewarded for
their contributions to joint research projects.
Third party beneﬁciaries
In science and medicine, the majority of the beneﬁts of a project often return
to people other than the particular individuals who contribute to it. For
example, a disease surveillance programme that takes blood and saliva samples
from patients is normally intended to beneﬁt at least the local population,
and could be crucial to preventing national or international outbreaks of
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disease. Likewise, the primary function of medical research is to beneﬁt future
patients, not research participants themselves. Indeed, in both of these cases,
there are sometimes projects that are not expected to beneﬁt the majority
contributors at all, but generate great beneﬁts for other people. The surveil-
lance programme may only have beneﬁts for people who have not already
been infected. The research may only result in new clinical interventions years
after the participants have died from their disease. How can such projects
avoid exploitation?
Notice, ﬁrst, that the identity of the beneﬁciaries seems to matter greatly. In
the cases I mentioned in the introduction, the complaints of exploitation were
levelled at institutions and other actors from rich countries who were per-
ceived as beneﬁting too much. Part of the grounds for the complaints was that
a particular set of people would not beneﬁt – poor Indonesians, patients in
LMICs, indigenous populations. But this latter set of people is much larger
than the set of people who directly contribute to the project. It was not all
Indonesians who were contributing samples to the Global Inﬂuenza Surveil-
lance Network. And it is not all members of a host community or nation who
participate in a research study. This suggests that exploitation can sometimes
be avoided by providing beneﬁts to people who are not themselves parties to
the transaction.
Which beneﬁciaries count? That is, when does a beneﬁt to a third party
count towards an assessment of whether the distribution of the burdens and
beneﬁts of a transaction is fair? Since the third parties are not themselves
involved in the transaction, we must presumably count their interests as in
some sense co-extensive with those of a party to the transaction. That party
will be contributing to the project on behalf of these third parties (and they
will, as it were, be beneﬁting on her behalf). We may distinguish two types of
relationships in which this makes sense: reciprocal relationships and relationships
of identiﬁcation.
Reciprocal relationships occur when people repeatedly interact with each
other in ways that provide beneﬁts to both parties. In such cases, while the
distribution of beneﬁts and burdens within one transaction may be unequal
and not reﬂect the parties’ respective contributions, their transactions taken as
a whole may not lead to an unfair distribution of beneﬁts and burdens. For
example, within a community, people may work with each other, lend money
to each other, share resources, watch each other’s children, manage common
land, be governed by the same institutions, and so on. One person from the
community taking on a burden to help others may reasonably expect reciprocal
burdens to be taken on by the others at diﬀerent times.
Reciprocal relationships need not even require the actual beneﬁts and burdens
between parties to balance out. Hypothetical contributions can count here,
too, i.e. when one party would contribute to a social good or help another,
were the occasion to arise. Such hypothetical acts are partly constitutive of
some relationships, such as community membership and friendship. Friends
not only do, but arguably should, perform favours for one another without
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accounting. That one person does much more for her friend than he does for
her does not imply any unfair treatment, provided that he would do the same
for her under the right circumstances. The richer friend regularly pays for
dinner, though the poorer one would do so if their circumstances were
reversed. Everyone watches the game at the house of the person with the televi-
sion, though each would host if she were the television owner instead.12 Only
when the opportunity for reciprocation arises and the purported friend fails to
do his part is there cause for her to complain that he is not a true friend, or,
pertinent to this discussion, that he was exploiting her friendship.
This idea about whose interests count makes sense of why beneﬁts to a
person’s community or fellow citizens might prevent her from being exploited
by an outsider. For example, as noted above, it is commonly thought that
research in LMICs that is “responsive”, that is, research that addresses an
important health problem of the population from which research participants
are drawn, is not exploitative. One explanation for this is that the members of
the population that beneﬁt are often part of a wider system of reciprocation.
Research participants may contribute to the health of others in their com-
munity or society. But where others within that population also contribute in
diﬀerent ways, or even where they would contribute if the opportunity arose,
the beneﬁts of the research to this population may prevent it from being
exploitative.13
Relationships of identiﬁcation occur when someone regards the interests of
another as though they were her own. For example, a parent might choose a
beneﬁt to her child over a beneﬁt to herself without regarding it as a sacriﬁce.
Spouses and close friends may ﬁnd that their lives intertwine to the extent
that the successes and losses they care about are as much the other person’s as
their own. In such cases, if the person involved in a transaction reasonably
regards the interests in question as equivalent to her own interests, it seems
reasonable for others to do so as well. Again, beneﬁts to the other person
could then be counted for the avoidance of exploitation.14
Reciprocal relationships and relationships of identiﬁcation frequently
coincide. We often interact for mutual beneﬁt with those whom we care about
and we naturally come to care about those with whom we beneﬁcially
interact. Thus we should expect overlap between these two cases in which
beneﬁts to a third party can count towards an assessment of the fairness of
the terms of a transaction.
The foregoing analysis of when beneﬁts to a third party can count towards
an assessment of the fairness of the terms of a transaction ﬁts well with many
people’s intuitive judgments about cases. For example, it explains why beneﬁts
to the communities from which research participants are drawn can prevent
research from being exploitative, even if those communities are not them-
selves heavily involved in the research. And it correctly places beneﬁciaries
like company shareholders, researchers whose careers are advanced by the
research and wealthy patient groups on the other side of the scale. Research
may be conducted on behalf of these beneﬁciaries. But they are not normally
192 Joseph Millum
Bodily Exchanges, Bioethics and Border Crossing; edited by Erik Malmqvist
and Kristin Zeiler
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/BBC_RAPS/ApplicationFiles/
9781138858763_text.3d;
the beneﬁciaries on behalf of whom research participants in LMICs take on
burdens and contribute to generalizable knowledge. The beneﬁts to these latter
beneﬁciaries are the ones that must be balanced by beneﬁts to the research
participants (or those with whom the research participants have relationships
of reciprocation or identiﬁcation).15
Cautionary notes
These conclusions about whose beneﬁts count should be interpreted and
implemented with caution. First, we should beware of exacerbating injustice.
The fact that people are part of a social system, even one that they endorse,
does not entail that their positions with respect to each other are (roughly)
fair and thus that it is acceptable to ask one to take on burdens for the sake of
another. There is always the risk that the less privileged members of a com-
munity will end up bearing burdens from which the more privileged members
beneﬁt, or the elite of a country will themselves exploit other members of the
population. In general, we should be alert for unjust social structures
that make certain people bear burdens for others, and wary of relying on the
self-serving testimony of powerful people who claim to speak for others.
Second, whether or not we count a third party’s interests depends on whether
the person directly involved in the transaction agrees. In these situations, one
party to the transaction is asking another to contribute or take on burdens on
behalf of third parties. It may be that the second party declines to do so. The
claim argued for in the previous section is not that the interests of others
actually are the interests of the person directly involved in the transaction,
just that it is acceptable to ask her to count them as such, for the purposes of
analysing the transaction’s fairness. For example, you cannot unilaterally
decide to pay my brother for work I do and thereby claim to have given me a
fair deal, even if I identify with his interests. I would have to agree to it.
The other side of this cautionary note is that the contributor’s agreement to
let certain beneﬁts count is necessary but it is not suﬃcient for them actually
to count for the purposes of assessing a transaction’s fairness. With both
reciprocal relationships and relationships of identiﬁcation it is a matter of fact
whether the relationship obtains. Whether or not the members of a community
are in reciprocal relationships with one another depends on how they do and
would help each other. Whether someone identiﬁes with the interests of a
distant relative depends on various facts about her relationship to him, her
conception of herself and the signiﬁcance that family has for her. Neither
relationship can be created by a simple speech act, such as giving consent.
Conclusions
People are rightly concerned about how to ethically transact with those who
are victims of global injustice. I have identiﬁed three areas of possible concern:
the existence of disparities may encourage the perception of wrongdoing,
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there may be duties to ameliorate injustice, and disparities between transacting
parties make exploitation easier and therefore more likely. Analysis of this last
category suggests that it is normally easier to ensure that the beneﬁts and
burdens of transactions are shared fairly than to eliminate the power disparities
that make it possible for some to take advantage of others. Fair distributions of
beneﬁts and burdens can be achieved through the provision of beneﬁts more
widely than just to the parties directly involved in a transaction. In particular,
it can be helpful to conceptualize the burdens or contributions someone
assumes or makes as being on behalf of others. This explains why beneﬁts to
community members, fellow disease suﬀerers or co-nationals can have ethical
signiﬁcance.
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Notes
1 Strictly speaking, both parties could be victims of injustice, since I am concerned
with any case in which there are signiﬁcant unjust disparities between the trans-
acting parties. For ease of expression, I continue to describe one as the beneﬁciary
and one as the victim.
2 Compare Rawls (1971, 7).
3 For a brief overview see Millum (2012a, 20–24).
4 The extension to more than two parties should not throw up any additional ethical
concerns, though it may generate additional coordination problems.
5 Throughout I describe the party who is more advantaged as the more powerful
party. However, this is a simpliﬁcation. Not only is the concept of power multi-faceted,
but the relative power of two individuals is highly sensitive to context. The relative
power of a rich tourist in Brazil and a poor slum dweller will change depending on
whether the tourist is at his hotel bar or lost in a favela. Likewise, considered as a
dyad, a healthy poor person with a kidney to sell may have more power than her
rich potential buyer, who urgently needs a transplant. But if there are many
people willing to sell their kidneys this power dynamic may reverse. Thanks to
Alan Wertheimer for this point.
6 An alternative to the duty to rescue might be something like the second original
position posited by Rawls, which he argues leads to a duty on peoples to assist
burdened societies (Rawls 1999, 105–113).
7 For an example worked through at greater length see Merritt et al. (2010).
8 Similar conclusions have been reached regarding the source of obligations to
research participants and host communities. See, e.g., Hughes (2014), and for a
contrary view London (2005).
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9 I do not mean to imply that all sweatshop labour is freely chosen, only that it can
be freely chosen and yet still be exploitative.
10 Article 1 of the Convention on Biological Diversity states: “The objectives of this
Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its relevant provisions, are the con-
servation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair
and equitable sharing of the beneﬁts arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources” (UN 1992). The requirement for “fair and equitable” beneﬁt-sharing
thus writes into the Convention how beneﬁts should be allocated – albeit at a
rather abstract level – rather than relying on free, individual negotiations to decide
allocations at a case-by-case level.
11 It does not follow that they are successful in doing so – an improvement in the
terms of a contract may still not bring the contracting parties to the level of being
fairly treated.
12 The rules of friendship are, at least partly, a product of culture. These examples are
simply meant to illustrate the existence of conceptions of reciprocal relationships
that are familiar from other areas of people’s lives.
13 Cf. Millum (2012b) which draws an analogy with how research is (ideally) incor-
porated into health systems for the beneﬁt of all. Compare the analysis given by
Hughes (2012), who argues that it is not justiﬁable for researchers to ask research
participants in LMICs to take on substantial net risks in order to beneﬁt patients
in high-income countries. However, he argues that it is permissible to ask such
participants to take on substantial net risks to beneﬁt people in their own socio-
economic class (or those worse oﬀ than they are). Note that Hughes is interested in
when it is appropriate to ask people to act altruistically, rather than with how to
analyse the fairness of a distribution of beneﬁts.
14 One interesting question concerns how these beneﬁts are to be counted. Someone
might, for example, identify much more with the interests of her spouse or child
than with her co-nationals. A precise reckoning might analyse this by discounting
for more distant relationships. Such precision is outside the bounds of this
chapter.
15 There are some interesting grey cases that are illuminated by this analysis. Patients
with the same disease may feel solidarity with one another. Such solidarity might
constitute an appropriate justiﬁcation for asking some of them to take on burdens,
such as through research participation, for the beneﬁt of others, even if they have
no other connection. Similarly, poor populations in diﬀerent countries might
reasonably take on burdens and make contributions on each other’s behalves when
it would be inappropriate to ask them to do so for more advantaged groups.
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